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Abstract 
 
Using a large sample of diversified firms from 38 countries we investigate the influence of 
several national-level institutional factors or ‘institutional voids’ on the value of corporate 
diversification. Specifically, we explore whether the presence of frictions in a country’s capital 
markets, labor markets, and product markets, affect the excess value of diversified firms. We 
find that the value of diversified firms relative to their single-segment peers is higher in countries 
with less efficient capital and labor markets, but find no evidence that product market efficiency 
affects the relative value of diversification. These results provide support for the theory of 
internal capital markets that argues that internal capital allocation would be relatively more 
beneficial in the presence of frictions in the external capital markets. In addition, the results show 
that diversification can be beneficial in the presence of frictions in the labor market.  
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The effect of corporate diversification on firm value has been a focus of significant 
scholarly inquiry and debate over the past two decades. Core to this debate has been the so-called 
diversification discount. The “diversification discount” refers to the empirical observation that 
diversified firms are on average undervalued relative to their single-segment peers (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). While initially seen as evidence of value destruction from 
corporate diversification, subsequent work (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004) has 
shown that the finding of an average discount in the United States can be attributed entirely to 
sample-selection biases, calling into question the interpretation of the discount as evidence of 
value destruction arising from diversification. Furthermore, the finding that the discount found 
using Compustat data disappears when corporate operations are classified into business units 
using more fine-grained data calls into question the mere existence of a discount in the United 
States (Villalonga, 2003). It is worth noting, however, that the focus of this debate has been on 
the average effect of diversification on firm value. Scholars on both sides of the debate have 
found significant variance across diversified firms in the discounts and premiums at which they 
trade relative to single-segment firms, yet the sources of this variance have received much less 
attention (Stein, 2003). Moreover, outside of the United States the evidence about the mere 
existence of a discount is mixed, and has been subject to much less scrutiny (Villalonga, 2003). 
The present study seeks to fill this gap by examining how the strength of a country’s institutional 
environment affects the value added by corporate diversification.  
Prior work examining corporate diversification in an international context has tended to 
choose sample countries with similar degrees of institutional development. In separate studies,  
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Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002) explore the existence of a diversification discount in well-
developed institutional environments as well as emerging markets. While these studies reveal the 
presence of a diversification discount in both well-developed and weak institutional contexts as 
well as the role that ownership structures may play, they shed less light on whether (and which) 
aspects of a country’s institutional environment influence the value of diversification. Similarly, 
while studies have shown that conglomerates or business groups in emerging markets can add 
significant value to member firms leading to a valuation premium for diversified groups (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), it remains to be seen which factors related to 
institutional development explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variance regarding 
the value of diversification across the world. Doing so requires a representative sample of firms 
from different institutional environments as well as measures of institutional development on 
multiple dimensions. 
One effort in this regard is the work of Fauver et al. (2003), who attempt to link a 
country’s state of capital market development to the value of internal capital allocation, but fail 
to find an effect. However, this study is limited in several key respects. First, due to poor 
coverage of emerging markets during the sample period (between 1991-1995), their international 
sample consists primarily of firms from developed institutional contexts. As a result, the lack of 
a relationship between the efficiency of external capital markets and the value of corporate 
diversification may be due to insufficient variation in this institutional factor. Second, the study 
did not examine whether aspects of the institutional environment highlighted in prior theoretical 
work, such as the quality of the country’s labor market and the efficiency of its product markets,  
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do in fact influence the value of diversification (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). Third, as prior 
scholars have highlighted, endogeneity issues are a significant factor in any analysis of the value 
added by diversification (Villalonga, 2003). Consequently, the lack of self-selection models cast 
concern over their prior findings. Finally, since the primary explanatory variables regarding 
institutional efficiency vary only at the country-level, standard errors must be corrected by 
clustering at the country-level.  Consequently, in light of the limitations of prior work in this 
domain, Stein (2003) notes that “taken together, the results from this effort thus far seem 
inconclusive.” 
In this paper, we investigate whether and how the value of corporate diversification 
varies with institutional development. Namely, which institutional factors, if any, drive the 
observed differences in the value of diversification across firms and countries? To answer this 
question, we assemble a large data set consisting of diversified firms from 38 countries over the 
15-year period from 1995 to 2009. We focus on several institutional variables that might affect 
the value of diversification, including the efficiency of a country’s capital markets, labor 
markets, and product markets. Specifically, we analyze whether these institutional variables 
explain the variance in the value of diversified firms across different countries, as well as within 
the same country over time. 
Consistent with Stein’s (1997) internal capital markets theory, which suggests that the 
ability of diversified firms to fund and pursue projects by reallocating funds from other divisions 
is significantly more valuable in settings with frictions in the external capital market, we find that 
the value of diversified firms relative to their single-segment peers is indeed higher in countries  
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with less efficient capital markets. In addition, we find evidence that the efficiency of the 
country’s labor market also has a significant effect on the excess value of diversified firms. In 
countries where frictions in the labor markets are present, the value of diversified firms relative 
to their single-segment peers is greater. This finding supports Khanna and Palepu’s (2010) 
argument that other institutional voids besides those that may exist in capital markets can also 
influence the value of corporate diversification. However, we find that the efficiency of a 
country’s product market does not influence the relative value of diversified firms, after the state 
of the external capital markets and labor markets are accounted for. This finding suggests that 
frictions in the input factor markets, e.g. capital and labor, dominate frictions in the output factor 
market, as determinants of the value of diversification. 
In addition to our cross-sectional analysis of the value of diversification, we estimate 
models with country fixed effects to examine whether changes in the institutional environment of 
a given country over time influence the relative value of its diversified firms. Consistent with 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2011), 
we find evidence that as capital markets become more efficient, the value of corporate 
diversification decreases. Changes in other institutional factors within a country have no 
significant impact on the value of diversification. It is important to note, however, that these 
other factors exhibit little longitudinal variation within a given country, which makes difficult to 
identify their effect on the value of diversification using just changes within a country over time. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our predictions about the 
effect of institutional factors on the value of corporation diversification. Section II describes the  
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sample and the data. Section III presents the results of our analysis of whether and which 
institutional factors explain the variation in the value of diversification around the world. Section 
IV presents some robustness checks. Section V analyzes within-country changes in the value of 
diversification. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. The Institutional Environment and the Value of Corporate Diversification 
The value of internal capital allocation and thus, corporate diversification, is likely to 
depend on a firm’s institutional environment (Williamson, 1975). Specifically, the literature on 
internal capital markets has highlighted several potential benefits and costs to internal capital 
allocation, the net effect of which should vary with the institutional context. The main benefit of 
internal capital allocation is the ability of corporate headquarters to engage in “winner picking,” 
whereby funds can be diverted away from one division to pursue more promising projects in 
another division that might be capital-constrained in more focused firms (Stein, 1997). Focused 
or stand-alone firms may face capital constraints regarding such projects due to imperfections in 
the external capital market arising from information asymmetries or a generalized shortage of 
credit offered by the external markets (Stein, 1997; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2011).  
However, internal capital markets also present a ‘dark side’, where the CEO or divisional 
managers may engage in rent-seeking behavior that leads to a misallocation of corporate 
resources (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). In institutional 
contexts where external capital markets are inefficient and fraught with imperfections, the 
benefits of ‘winner picking’ become more significant and counter the costs of rent-seeking  
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behavior to a greater extent. As a result, diversification is likely to be more valuable in countries 
with less efficient external capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Apart from the efficiency of external capital markets, prior work notes that the presence 
of other “institutional voids” may also increase the value of corporate diversification (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1999). In particular, frictions in a country’s labor market may substantially increase 
the transaction costs associated with operating a stand-alone business relative to a diversified 
operation (Williamson, 1975). Inefficiencies in the labor market may arise from a variety of 
sources including the limited supply of talent from professional or technical schools, the 
decreased ability of employees to leave their existing employer and move to another one, and 
undue governmental inference in wage negotiations between labor and business (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1999, 2010). Such frictions in the labor market can significantly increase the costs 
associated with searching for and securing the technical and managerial talent needed for a 
promising project. Internal labor markets operated by diversified firms in such environments can 
minimize these transaction costs. For example, diversified firms have the ability to source 
managerial talent from other existing divisions. Indeed, Tate and Yang (2012), who analyze the 
labor market consequences of corporate diversification within the United States, find that 
workers in diversified firms have greater cross-industry mobility within and across firms, and 
that diversified firms benefit from the opportunity to redeploy workers internally from declining 
to expanding industries. Moreover, the ability to expose internal talent to a diverse set of 
situations and business activities may enable diversified firms to develop internal talent and  
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overcome limitations in educational infrastructure. As a result, corporate diversification may be 
more valuable in contexts with voids in their labor market institutions. 
Another institutional void concerns the efficiency of a country’s product markets. 
Specifically, this refers to the extent to which a country’s regulatory and political context 
promotes fair and effective competition among firms in the product marketplace. Barriers to 
entry instituted by direct government intervention or excessive regulatory hurdles can lead to the 
lack of entry of intermediaries such as retailers, who are needed to facilitate the sale of goods and 
services to consumers (Khanna and Palepu 2010). Similarly, import tariffs and processing 
hurdles set up by customs authorities can limit the timely supply of necessary inputs to firms, 
restricting their ability to compete downstream. Moreover, regulatory roadblocks can impede the 
ability of firms to exploit new business opportunities that might emerge through the introduction 
of new products or services.  Finally, direct government involvement, through state control of 
enterprises or subsidies to certain groups may further distort the ability to compete fairly in 
certain industries. Unlike stand-alone enterprises, divisions in diversified companies can 
overcome some of these obstacles by leveraging the experience and resources of other divisions 
within the company. For example, diversified firms may be able to overcome the lack of suitable 
intermediaries for the distribution and sale of its products from one business by deploying its 
distribution and retail assets from another. Furthermore, a diversified firm may be able to 
leverage its experience and relationships with regulatory authorities from one business to 
expedite the administrative process required to pursue new opportunities in another line of 
business. Diversified firms may also be able to exploit economies of scope through the sharing of  
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common inputs between divisions (Penrose 1959). Consequently, they may be able to reduce the 
risk of a supply disruption, if the necessary raw materials are available from other divisions. As a 
result, diversification is likely to be more valuable in institutional environments characterized by 
inefficient product markets.    
 
II. Data and Variables 
A. Sample 
Our sample consists of 10,164 diversified and 21,737 single-segment firms across the 
world that we draw from the Worldscope international database.
1 Worldscope maintains 
financial and business segment data on publicly listed companies across the world.
2 The 
aggregate market capitalization of companies in the Worldscope database stands at 
approximately 95% of the total value of the world’s markets (Thomson Financial, 2003). While 
the database targets publicly listed firms from 53 countries, its coverage of emerging markets is 
quite weak before 1995 (Lins and Servaes, 2002). Therefore our sample period begins in 1995, 
and ends in 2009. Worldscope records financial data regarding a firm’s 10 largest business 
segments, each of which is assigned a 4-digit SIC code to indicate its industry affiliation.  
Following previous literature, we classify diversified firms as those with at least two 
segments with distinct 4-digit SIC codes (Berger and Ofek 1995; Villalonga 2004). Due to a 
                                                       
1 Our primary sample is restricted to diversified firms. However, single-segment firms are used in the computation 
of the excess values of our diversified firms as well as in the first stage of the two-step Heckman selection models. 
 
2 For other studies that have used segment data from Worldscope for international firms see Lins and Servaes 
(1999), Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), and Healy et al. (2011). 
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significant degree of missing asset totals for individual segments, we focus on the sales figures of 
individual segments in constructing both our dependent variable as well as selecting firms into 
our sample. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we restrict our sample of diversified firms to 
those firm-year observations where the segment totals are not subject to significant under or 
over-reporting. Specifically, we restrict our sample to those diversified firms for which the sum 
of segment sales was within 5% of the firm’s total sales in that year. Furthermore, we ensure that 
our sample firms had no segments with one-digit SIC codes of 0 (agriculture), 6 (financial), or 9 
(government). In total, we have 35,886 firm-year observations from 10,164 diversified firms 
across 38 countries. Table I shows a breakdown of the number of observations per country. 
Firms from the United States, Japan, and United Kingdom represent 45%, 18%, and 11% of the 
sample, with a substantial number of observations also coming from Australia, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
[Table I approximately here] 
 
B. Measures 
Dependent Variable.  
The dependent variable of our study is Excess Value, a measure developed by Berger and 
Ofek (1995) that represents the value of a diversified firm relative to its single-segment peers. 
Excess values are computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s market value 
and its imputed value at the end of the year. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ 
imputed values, which are obtained by multiplying the segment’s sales total by the median  
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market-to-sales ratio of single-segment firms in the same industry, country, and year. The 
industry matching is carried out using the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at least five 
single-segment firms. Due to potential over or under-reporting of segment sales totals (within our 
5% threshold), we gross up or down the imputed value by the percentage deviation in firm sales 
and segment sales totals. Furthermore, following prior literature on the diversification discount, 
we exclude outliers from our analysis. Specifically, we exclude observations with excess values 
that fall beyond the two standard deviations from the mean. Yet our results are very similar if we 
define outliers to be excess values that fall beyond the top 1% and bottom 1% of all excess 
values. 
Table I shows mean and median excess values per country. As the table shows, there is 
considerable variation across countries in the value of diversified firms relative to single-segment 
firms, ranging from a discount of 75% for New Zealand to a premium of 62% for Russia. 
However, the countries at the tails of the distributions have very few observations. Leaving aside 
those countries with less than 20 observations, the range narrows down to an average discount of 
46% for the Netherlands and a premium of 30% for Poland—still a very wide range. 
While our dependent variable measures the value of a diversified firm relative to its 
single segment peers, one potential source of bias in this measure is the fact that certain single-
segment firms may actually be members of business groups and thus have access to the capital 
resources of other firms (Khanna and Palepu 2000). The lack of widespread data on business 
group affiliations precludes us from accounting for such single-segment firms. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that certain single-segment comparables may actually have access to the internal  
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capital markets possessed by diversified firms, this should actually bias us away from finding an 
effect regarding the relative benefits of diversification in contexts with weaker institutions. As a 
result, our results would represent a conservative estimate on the relative value of diversification 
in such contexts. 
 
Independent Variables.  
The core independent variables in our analysis are measures of several key facets of a 
country’s institutional environment—the efficiency of its capital, labor, and product markets. 
Annual data on the institutional variables are derived from the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY). Since 1996, IMD has analyzed and ranked the ability of nations to create and 
maintain an environment that sustains enterprise competitiveness. The yearbook compares the 
performance of 58 countries based on more than 300 criteria measuring different facets of 
competitiveness. Approximately two thirds of the data come from statistical databases 
(international/national sources) and the remaining third from surveys (Executive Opinion 
Survey). The statistical indicators provided by WCY are acquired from international, national 
and regional organizations, private institutions and a network of 54 partner institutes worldwide. 
The Executive Opinion Survey measures perceptions of competitiveness by business executives 
who are dealing with international business situations. They cover factors that are not easily 
measurable using output data, such as management practices, labor relations, corruption, 
environmental concerns, and quality of life.   
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The measures of capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market 
efficiency are logarithms of reversed ordinal country rankings derived from pertinent WCY 
survey items which are outlined in Table III. The Capital Market Efficiency variable includes 
measures of the efficiency of banks, stock markets, and other types of financial intermediaries.
3 
The Product Market Efficiency variable includes measures that reflect both the openness of the 
product markets to foreign firms, and policies, laws and regulations that directly affect the level 
of competition in the product market. Labor Market Efficiency includes measures of the rigidity 
of the labor market and policies and laws that affect the supply of labor. To construct each of 
these variables, the institute first standardizes each of the WCY data items reported in the 
appendix in a given year by subtracting its mean and dividing by its cross-country standard 
deviation. This effectively forces each item to have equal importance. The institute then 
calculates the mean of the standardized survey items to generate an aggregate measure of capital, 
labor, and product market efficiency. For each of our institutional variables, the sample countries 
are assigned an ordinal ranking reflecting their relative performance. Finally, we reverse and take 
the logarithm of the ordinal rankings so that higher values of our institutional variables reflect 
contexts with higher efficiency.  
Summary statistics and pairwise correlations for the main variables are presented in Table 
II. Excess Value exhibits a negative univariate correlation with all institutional variables. As 
expected, all institutional variables exhibit a strong positive correlation (0.36–0.68). However, as 
                                                       
3 Apart from a country’s capital markets, firms could also access capital from foreign sources through Foreign 
Direct Investment. In unreported analyses, our results are robust to the inclusion of a control variable measuring 
FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP in all our models.   
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we will highlight later in the results section, variance inflation factors computed at the end of 
each analysis indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern in the analysis (Kutner et al., 2004). 
[Table II approximately here] 
 
Control Variables.  
In addition to the institutional variables that are the focus of our analysis, we include 
several control variables in all of our models. Specifically, we include the following firm 
characteristics: log of total assets, the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of 
assets, leverage, dividends paid as a percentage of equity, return on assets, and the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. We also control for the country’s economic performance to make 
sure that our institutional development measures are not merely capturing the country’s 
economic development.
 4 In analogous fashion to the institutional measures of our interest, a 
country’s economic performance is measured by the logarithm of its reverse WCY rank on that 
dimension, which takes into account the size, past and forecasted growth, and wealth of the 
domestic economy, the state of international trade, and international investments.  
 
III. How Do Institutional Factors Affect the Value of Corporate Diversification Across the 
World? 
A.  Multivariate OLS Regressions 
                                                       
4 For more information about this measure, see the IMD competitiveness report: 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/ep_list.pdf.  
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To examine the effect of our institutional variables on the relative value of diversified 
firms, we first run an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with Excess Value regressed as a 
function of Capital Market Efficiency, Labor Market Efficiency, Product Market Efficiency, and 
our control variables. The results are shown in Table III. Models (1) through (3) include only one 
of our institutional variables, while Model (4) includes all of them simultaneously as covariates. 
We note that, while our institutional variables are correlated with one another to a significant 
degree (see Table II), multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern in including them 
together in Model (4): The variance inflation factors computed for each of our covariates is less 
than 3.5, which is well below the typical threshold of 10 used to signal multicollinearity concerns 
(Kutner et al. 2004). All models include year fixed effects, and standard errors that are clustered 
by country and robust to heteroscedasticity. 
[Table III approximately here] 
 
The results of Models (1) – (3) indicate that when included on their own, Capital Market 
Efficiency, Labor Market Efficiency, and Product Market Efficiency each have negative 
coefficients that are significant at the 1% level.
5 In other words, in contexts where capital, labor, 
or product markets are more efficient, the value of diversified firms relative to their single-
segment peers decreases, as expected. In Model (4), where all our institutional variables are 
included at the same time. Capital Market Efficiency and Labor Market Efficiency continue to 
                                                       
5 In addition, we see in all models that ROA has a negative and highly significant coefficient. This counter-intuitive 
result is driven by the presence of small firms that have high growth opportunities but poor profitability. If we were 
to restrict our sample to those firms with annual sales above $15 million, the coefficient on ROA would be positive 
and highly significant.  
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load negatively and significantly. However, after controlling for these other institutional factors, 
the coefficient of Product Market Efficiency turns statistically insignificant. If a country 
improves its capital market efficiency rank from 55
th in the world to 20
th, the value of diversified 
firms relative to single-segment firms decreases by approximately 13% (based on the coefficient 
in Model (4)). Similarly, if a country improves its labor market efficiency rank from 40
th in the 
world to 20
th, the relative value of a diversified firm decreases by 6.5%. 
Collectively, the results from Model (4) provide evidence that institutional factors have a 
significant effect on the value of corporate diversification around the world. First, in support of 
the theory of internal capital markets, we find that the value of internal allocation and thus, the 
value of diversified firms relative to their single-segment peers is greater in contexts with less 
efficient capital markets (Stein, 1997, 2003). Moreover, we find evidence that the presence of 
frictions in a country’s labor market also influences the value of corporate diversification. 
Consistent with the theory of institutional ‘voids’ in emerging markets, we find that in 
institutional environments where labor markets are less efficient, the relative value of diversified 
firms is higher (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). While we find strong evidence that both capital and 
labor market efficiency influence the value of diversification across the world, there is little 
evidence that the efficiency of a country’s product market affects the value of corporate 
diversification. Nevertheless, the results of Table III provide strong evidence that different 
institutional factors do influence the value of corporate diversification. A question that still 
remains unanswered is whether these results are robust to self-selection models that account for 
the fact that diversification is not pursued randomly (Villalonga, 2004).  
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B.  Heckman Selection Models 
In order to account for the selection of firms into diversified status, we investigate the 
relationship between institutional factors and the excess value of diversified firms using the 
Heckman two-step selection model (Heckman 1979). In this approach, we model the selection of 
diversified status in the first stage and model excess values for diversified firms in the second 
stage. We do so by implementing the Heckman selection model using a maximum likelihood 
estimator, which estimates the two stages simultaneously. Heckman’s approach requires the 
application of exclusion restrictions to at least one variable – which is included in the first-stage 
selection model but that can be excluded from the second-stage regression model for the selected 
firms, since it is uncorrelated with the outcome. To this end, we use a variable used in prior work 
on the diversification discount: an indicator for whether the firm reports a non-zero amount for 
the minority interest on its balance sheet (Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; Hund et al., 2010). The 
rationale for using a minority interest indicator as an instrument is that it proxies for (possibly 
diversifying) acquisitions that happened in the past but need not be correlated with 
contemporaneous segment-level unobservables. 
[Table IV approximately here] 
 
Table IV displays the results of the Heckman selection models. Similar to the previous 
table, we have separate selection models for each institutional variable (Models (1) – (3)), and a 
model with all three institutional variables included at the same time (Model (4)). However, due 
to the importance of accounting for other institutional factors in the analysis of any one of them,  
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we will focus our discussion of this table on the results of the Model (4). Moreover, in the 
interest of conserving space, we display just the selection-corrected results of the second stage of 
the Heckman model for Models (1) – (3), but display both stages for the results of our complete 
model, Model (4). The first-stage results are similar across all four models, though. 
The first stage of the model is estimated with 129,667 observations, 35,886 of them 
representing diversified firms and the rest single-segment firms. Examining the first stage of the 
Heckman selection model, we observe that our instrumental variable, Minority Interest, has a 
positive coefficient and is significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with prior work that has 
found diversified US firms to be significantly more likely to hold a non-zero amount of minority 
interest on their balance sheets (Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; Hund et al., 2010). While not the main 
focus of our empirical analysis, we also note that one of our institutional variables, Labor Market 
Efficiency, appears to predict the likelihood that a firm would be diversified. Specifically, firms 
in countries with less efficient labor markets are more likely to be diversified, than in contexts 
where these markets are more efficient. This would be expected if less-efficient labor markets 
institutional environments do indeed make diversification more valuable. However, we do not 
find similar associations between our other institutional variables and the likelihood of 
diversification. Recent work has found that firms exhibit greater levels of vertical integration in 
contexts with greater contracting hazards and financial development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Mitton 2009). Our finding that certain characteristics of the institutional environment also 
significantly influence the likelihood of corporate diversification (i.e. the horizontal scope of the 
firm) further extends this literature.  
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Turning to the second stage of the Heckman model, we observe that Capital Market 
Efficiency and Labor Market Efficiency both have negative coefficients that are significant at the 
1% level. Therefore, consistent with our OLS results from Table IV, we continue to find that the 
value of diversified firms relative to their single-segment counterparts is greater in institutional 
settings with frictions in their capital and labor markets. Furthermore, in line with the prior OLS 
analysis, we again find that Product Market Efficiency has an insignificant effect on the value of 
diversified firms, after accounting for the other institutional factors. Overall, the results of the 
Heckman selection models in Table IV provide strong evidence that our earlier findings are not 
driven by self-selection biases.  
 
C.  Propensity Score Matching 
Villalonga (2004) argues that the diversification discount can be attributed to the 
difficulty of finding truly comparable single-segment firms. Using propensity-score matching to 
find comparable firms, she finds that excess values increase on average, to thr point of turning 
the average discount found in U.S. data into a premium. It is important to recognize that 
systematically underestimating the value of diversification is not necessarily a problem for this 
study, because we are interested in the cross-country variation of the discount rather than the 
average discount. However, if the bias on the value of diversification introduced by the difficulty  
of finding appropriate comparable firms varies systematically with institutional factors, then this 
could bias the estimated coefficients on the institutional factors. In other words, if we are  
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underestimating the value of diversification more in countries with more developed capital and 
labor markets then this methodological problem could produce our results. 
To examine this alternative explanation, we estimate propensity score matching models 
and derive an adjusted excess value estimate for each country. These bias-corrected excess 
values are computed using one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching with a caliper 
of 0.001, where diversified firms are matched to single-segment firms in the same country on the 
natural logarithm of total assets, return on assets, cash over assets, capital expenditures over 
assets, leverage, and dividends paid as a percentage of equity. Due to data limitations, we are 
only able to derive the estimates for 29 out of 38 countries. Consistent with prior literature, we 
find that the adjusted excess values are higher for 23 out of the 29 countries. The average mean 
excess value across countries is -12.3% while the adjusted one is -6.4%. However, the 
underestimation of excess value did not vary much across countries. Because propensity score 
matching factors in firm-level variables such as size, profitability, leverage, etc. in the estimation 
of the discount, we calculated the difference between these propensity score matching estimates 
and the OLS estimates of the discount (Berger and Ofek 1995). The correlation between this 
difference and our institutional variables was insignificant. 
The univariate correlation between the excess value and the adjusted excess value across 
countries is 0.95. In summary, the relations documented here between value of diversification 
and institutions do not seem to be affected by the selection of comparable firms. 
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IV. Robustness Checks 
A. OLS and Heckman Models without Diversified Firms from the United States 
While our sample has a significant number of observations from countries other than the 
United States, observations from the United States still account for approximately 45% of our 
sample. As a result, it is unclear whether our results are driven by the inclusion of these US 
firms, or whether our institutional variables still explain variation in the value of diversification 
across a non-US subsample. In the following analysis, we exclude all US firms and model excess 
values as a function of our institutional factors using both multivariate OLS and Heckman 
selection models. The results of this analysis on the non-US subsample are presented in Table V. 
[Table V approximately here] 
 
Excluding US firms reduces the sample of diversified firms to 19,799 observations. The 
results of Table V are very similar to the results from the prior analyses that included diversified 
firms from the United States (Tables 3 and 4). As before, we see that Capital Market Efficiency 
and Labor Market Efficiency have negative coefficients that are significant in both the OLS (at 
the 5% level) and Heckman models (at the 1% level). As a result, we find that the efficiency of 
capital and labor markets continue to significantly affect the value of diversification across 
countries outside the United States. Again, the relative value of diversified firms is greater in 
countries with less efficient capital and labor markets. These results increase our confidence that 
the results are not driven solely by the inclusion of US firms.  
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B. OLS and Heckman Models with Diversified Firms from Countries with at Least 100 
Observations 
Just like there may have been a concern that our results are driven by the large number of 
observations from the United States, another source of concern may lie in the few observations 
many countries in our sample have. As an additional robustness test, we exclude all countries 
from our analysis that have less than 100 diversified-year observations. After enforcing this 
limit, we are left with only 18 counties, and thus clusters with which to adjust our standard 
errors. Nevertheless, we present the results of both the OLS analysis and the Heckman selection 
model run on observations from these 18 countries in Table VI.  
[Table VI approximately here] 
 
The results of Table VI are consistent with the results of the main analysis with 
observations from 38 countries (Table III). Again, we find that Capital Market Efficiency and 
Labor Market Efficiency have negative coefficients that are significant in both the OLS (at the 
5% level and 1% level, respectively) and Heckman models (at the 1% level). As a result, we find 
that the efficiency of capital and labor markets continue to significantly affect the value of 
diversification across countries with a larger number of observations in our overall sample. 
Furthermore, if we were to additionally exclude diversified firms from the United States from the 
analyses in Table VI, we continue to obtain similar results. The results of this table indicate that 
our main results are not substantially influenced by the inclusion of countries in our sample with 
relatively few observations.  
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C. Imputing Segment Value with a Minimum of Three Comparable Firms 
As is standard practice in the literature on the diversification discount, the imputed value 
of a firm’s segment (used to eventually calculate a firm’s excess value) was derived from the 
median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in that industry (Berger and 
Ofek 1995; Villalonga 2004). However, since the requirement of five single-segments firms in 
the same industry may be too restrictive for certain countries in our sample, we perform an 
additional analysis with the requirement of only three comparable single-segment firms needed 
to impute the value of a firm’s segment. The drawback of requiring fewer comparable single-
segment firms is that the imputed value of a firm’s segment may potentially be less reliable and 
noisier than when we require at least five comparable firms. After computing the modified 
excess values for diversified firms, we analyze the relationship between our institutional 
variables and these excess values using both a multivariate OLS regression and a Heckman 
selection model. However, unlike the previous analysis, we only show models where all our 
institutional variables are included at the same time. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table V. 
[Table VII approximately here] 
 
The results of Table VII further support the effect of our institutional variables on the 
value of corporate diversification around the world. The sample now has increased to 42,034 
observations from 35,886 observations, where the new observations come primarily from 
Australia, China, India, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, the UK, and the United States. In particular,  
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after relaxing the requirement of five single-segment comparables to three in order to impute 
segment values, we continue to find that Capital Market Efficiency and Labor Market Efficiency 
have negative and significant coefficients (at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively) in the OLS 
model. Turning to the Heckman model, we again find that Capital Market Efficiency is highly 
significant at the 1% level. However, in contrast to the OLS results, we find that Labor Market 
Efficiency is more significant at the 5% level, after accounting for self-selection. In summary, we 
continue to find that the relative value of diversified firms is greater in contexts with inefficient 
capital and labor markets. In the case of Product Market Efficiency, we continue to find that it 
remains insignificant in influencing the value of diversification across the world. Overall, the 
results of Table VII are broadly consistent with the significant results of prior analyses that 
required five single-segment comparables to impute segment values.  
 
V. Do Within-Country Changes in Institutional Factors Affect the Value of Corporate 
Diversification? 
While institutional factors have been found to explain cross-sectional variation in the 
value of diversification across the world, it remains to be seen whether changes in these 
institutional variables also explain within-country variation in the value of diversification over 
time. Doing so requires country fixed effects to be included in the multivariate analysis, to 
isolate the effect of changes in our institutional variables within each country. Prior literature has 
found that the relative value of diversified firms can change over time. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1991) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue that the reason why conglomerate mergers triggered  
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positive market reactions during the 1960s but not during the 1980s is because of the secular 
increase in the efficiency of external capital markets, which translates into a relative decrease in 
the perceived efficiency of tha alternative—internal capital markets within conglomerates. 
Servaes (1996) examines changes in the diversification discount in the United States during the 
conglomerate merger wave (from 1961 to 1976) and finds that while there was a significant 
discount in the 1960s, the discount was reduced considerably in the early to late 1970s. 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2011) show that the value of corporate diversification increased 
during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, partly due to changes in the relative efficiency of 
external and internal capital markets. We extend this line of work with an international sample 
and examine whether changes in the state of the institutional environment within a country 
explains changes in the value of diversification. Table VIII displays the results of such an 
analysis.  
[Table VIII approximately here] 
 
Table VIII presents the results of several OLS regression models with each of our 
institutional variables included separately (Models (1) – (3)), with the final model including all 
three (Model (4)). Again, each model includes country fixed effects in order to focus on within-
country variation in the value of diversification over time. The results of this table show that 
Capital Market Efficiency loads significantly in the multivariate analysis (in Models (1) and (4)). 
However, Labor Market Efficiency does not load significantly both when it is included separately 
as well as together with the other institutional factors. Moreover, while Product Market  
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Efficiency has a positive and marginally significant coefficient in the full model (Model (4)), we 
view this result with suspicion given its lack of significance when included alone in Model (3). It 
is more than likely that the marginal significance of Product Market Efficiency in the full model 
is due to multicollinearity – significantly high variance inflation factors computed for this model 
support this argument. While we find no evidence that product and labor market efficiency 
explain within-country variation in the value of corporate diversification, these results should be 
interpreted with caution since these institutional variables do not change significantly within 
most countries over time. Nevertheless, we find significant evidence that changes in the state of a 
country’s capital markets do significantly affect the relative value of corporate diversification 
within the country over time. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2011), we find that a country’s capital markets become 
more efficient over time, the value of internal capital allocation decreases. As a result, the value 
of diversified firms relative to their single-segment peers is found to decrease. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether and which facets of a country’s institutional 
environment explain the variation in the value of corporate diversification around the world. 
Using data on diversified firms from 38 countries over a 15 year period, we explore the effect of 
three key institutional variables – capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product 
market efficiency – on the excess value of diversified firms relative to their single segment peers.  
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Using both OLS and self-selection models, we find that capital and labor market efficiency are 
important drivers of the value of diversification across the world. In doing so, we directly 
address recent calls to explore the drivers of cross-sectional variance in the diversification 
discount, rather than its main effect (Stein, 2003). Moreover, these findings validate theoretical 
work that highlight the importance of other institutional ‘voids’, such as the state of a country’s 
labor market, in analyzing the relative value of diversification across the world (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1999, 2010). Finally, we advance the limited literature examining variation in the value 
of diversification within countries over time (Servaes, 1996, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
2011). To our knowledge, the present study represents to first attempt to use an international 
sample to investigate within-country variation in the value of diversification. In doing so, we 
show that amongst all the institutional factors we consider, changes in the efficiency of a 
country’s capital markets drive variation in the excess value of diversified firms over time.  
We conclude by identifying a potential avenue for future research. Given the evidence in 
this paper that the value of diversification is contingent on the institutional infrastructure of a 
country, it would be interesting for future research to explore within the same firm how financing 
arrangements differ for diversification activities across countries with different institutional 
characteristics. Gaining a better understanding of this process would help us understand better 
the role of finance in the growth of corporations across countries. 
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Table I 
Breakdown of Diversified Firm Observations by Country 
The table presents a breakdown of the number of diversified-year observations for each country in our 
sample. In addition we present the mean and median Excess Value for diversified firms in each country. 
Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to its imputed value. A firm’s 
imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the segment’s sales 
total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in the same industry. 
 
Country  N  % of sample  Mean Excess 
Value  Median Excess Value 
Australia 511  1.42  -0.418  -0.500 
Belgium 5  0.01  0.035  0.446 
Brazil 40  0.11  0.093  -0.042 
Canada 1,138  3.17  -0.294  -0.313 
Chile 4  0.01  -0.062  0.020 
China 1,548  4.31  -0.091  -0.112 
Czech Republic  16  0.04  0.450  0.473 
Denmark 29  0.08  -0.328  -0.323 
Finland 48  0.13  -0.358  -0.396 
France 965  2.69  -0.085  -0.093 
Germany 958  2.67  -0.117  -0.149 
Greece 33  0.09  -0.076  -0.177 
Hong Kong  655  1.83  -0.375  -0.465 
India 573  1.6  -0.073  -0.061 
Indonesia 159  0.44  0.063  0.164 
Ireland 10  0.03  -0.590  -0.565 
Israel 60  0.17  -0.014  -0.072 
Italy 10  0.03  -0.513  -0.557 
Japan 6,493  18.09  -0.154  -0.146 
South Korea  90  0.25  -0.079  -0.104 
Malaysia 363  1.01  -0.269  -0.279 
Mexico 14  0.04  0.303  0.185 
Netherlands 75  0.21  -0.456  -0.638 
New Zealand  1  0.00  -0.750  -0.750 
Norway 61  0.17  -0.251  -0.331 
Philippines 14  0.04  0.320  0.334 
Poland 21  0.06  0.300  0.423 
Russian Federation  11  0.03  0.617  0.860 
Singapore 384  1.07  -0.235  -0.203 
South Africa  103  0.29  -0.207  -0.209 
Spain 6  0.02  -0.680  -0.583 
Sweden 336  0.94  -0.300  -0.295 
Switzerland 152  0.42  -0.325  -0.291 
Taiwan 519  1.45  0.055  0.075 
Thailand 347  0.97  0.113  0.123 
Turkey 12  0.03  0.545  0.554 
United Kingdom  4,035  11.24  -0.217  -0.220 
United States  16,087  44.83  -0.250  -0.242 
Overall Sample  35,886  100%  -0.207  -0.198 
  
 
2
Table II 
Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
The table presents summary statistics and pairwise correlations of variables used in subsequent tables. Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of a firm’s market value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the 
segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in the same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is 
the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a country’s capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 
published annually (rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater efficiency). Similarly, Labor Market 
Efficiency,  Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance are logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market 
efficiency, product market efficiency, and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
 
   Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
(1) Excess  Value  1.00 
(2)  Capital Market Efficiency  -0.09 1.00 
(3) Labor  Market  Efficiency  -0.06 0.36 1.00 
(4)  Product Market Efficiency  -0.07 0.68 0.49 1.00 
(5) Economic  Performance  -0.04 0.48 0.42 0.41 1.00 
(6) Log  Assets  0.13 0.03 0.03  -0.02 0.04 1.00 
(7)  % Cash of Assets  0.12 -0.04 -0.01  0.01 -0.02 -0.23  1.00 
(8) Leverage  -0.05  0.05 -0.05 -0.02  0.04  0.15 -0.42  1.00 
(9)  Dividends as % of Equity  0.03 0.05 0.00  -0.01  -0.01 0.17  -0.07 0.10 1.00 
(10) Profitability  (ROA)  0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08  0.33  -0.11  -0.19 0.14 1.00 
(11)  % CAPX of Assets  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04  -0.14 0.01 0.03 0.02 1.00 
    Mean  -0.207 3.786 3.750 3.602 3.868  12.260 0.153 0.524 0.029  -0.018 0.054 
Median  -0.198 3.970 3.892 3.584 3.989  12.143 0.096 0.529 0.006 0.027 0.038 
St.  Dev  0.650 0.368 0.372 0.205 0.257 1.997 0.169 0.225 0.076 0.202 0.061 
Q1  -0.627 3.689 3.689 3.466 3.784  10.953 0.030 0.361 0.000  -0.015 0.017 
    Q3  0.223 4.025 3.951 3.784 4.025  13.538 0.212 0.676 0.031 0.065 0.069 
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Table III 
The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Diversification: OLS Regressions 
The table presents multivariate OLS regressions where excess value is modeled as function of three 
institutional variables – capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market efficiency. 
Models (1) – (3) each include only one of these institutional variables, while all three covariates are 
included together in Model (4). Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value 
to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the 
product of the segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment 
firms in the same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a 
country’s capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, published 
annually (rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater 
efficiency). Similarly, Labor Market Efficiency, Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance 
are logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market efficiency, product market 
efficiency, and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. Standard errors are clustered by country and are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted 
by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
   Excess Value     Excess Value     Excess Value     Excess Value 
Capital  Market  Efficiency  -0.195 ***             -0.154 *** 
  (0.046)               (0.053)   
Labor  Market  Efficiency       -0.124 ***        -0.0830 *** 
       (0.034)          (0.027)   
Product  Market  Efficiency            -0.319 ***   -0.0647  
             (0.058)     (0.086)   
Economic  Performance  -0.061     -0.107 *    -0.081     -0.0170  
  (0.057)     (0.0602)     (0.052)     (0.057)   
Log  Assets  0.060 ***  0.060 ***  0.0596 ***  0.0605 *** 
(0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012) 
Cash  Percentage  0.605 ***  0.608 ***  0.615 ***  0.600 *** 
(0.062)     (0.055)     (0.056)     (0.059) 
Leverage  -0.065 ***  -0.080 ***  -0.075 ***  -0.081 *** 
(0.021)     (0.026)     (0.025)     (0.027) 
Dividends 0.167  0.115  0.115  0.162 
(0.165)     (0.172)     (0.190)     (0.162) 
ROA  -0.200 ***  -0.183 ***  -0.191 ***  -0.209 *** 
(0.044)     (0.051)     (0.0445)     (0.042) 
CAPX  0.688 ***  0.713 ***  0.703 ***  0.695 *** 
(0.104)     (0.092)     (0.093)     (0.101) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.0363  -0.0716  0.527  **  0.260 
  (0.162)     (0.194)     (0.198)     (0.270) 
N 35,886  35,886  35,886  35,886 
Number of Clusters 
(Countries)  38     38     38     38   
Adjusted R-Sq  0.064        0.059        0.062        0.066    
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Table IV 
The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Diversification: Heckman Selection Models 
The table presents the results of Heckman self-selection models where diversified status is modeled as a 
probit in the first stage, and where the excess value for diversified firms is modeled in the second stage. 
The first stage probit requires a sample of both single-segment (N = 93781) and diversified firms (N = 
35886), while the diversified firms represent the selected group for the second stage analysis. Heckman’s 
approach requires the application of exclusion restrictions to at least one variable – which is included in 
the first-stage selection model but that can be excluded from the second-stage regression model for the 
selected firms, since it is uncorrelated with the outcome. To this end, we use an indicator, Minority 
Interest, for whether the firm reports a non-zero amount for the minority interest on its balance sheet. The 
key independent variables in these selection models are three institutional variables – capital market 
efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market efficiency. Models (1) – (4) each include only one 
of these institutional variables, while all three covariates are included together in Model (4). Furthermore, 
only the second stages of the Heckman models are shown for Models (1) – (3), while both stages are 
shown for Model (4). Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to its 
imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the product 
of the segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in 
the same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a 
country’s capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, published 
annually (rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater 
efficiency). Similarly, Labor Market Efficiency, Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance 
are logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market efficiency, product market 
efficiency, and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. Standard errors are clustered by country and are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted 
by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
 
Excess Value  Excess Value  Excess Value  Diversified  Excess Value 
(2nd Stage)     (2nd Stage)     (2nd Stage)     (1st Stage)  (2nd Stage) 
Capital Market 
Efficiency 
-0.221 ***             -0.315   -0.182 *** 
(0.042)               (0.237)   (0.045)   
Labor Market 
Efficiency 
     -0.135 ***        -0.275 **  -0.103 *** 
     (0.037)          (0.118)   (0.029)   
Product Market 
Efficiency 
          -0.343 ***   0.129   -0.0547  
          (0.057)     (0.278)   (0.079)   
Economic 
Performance 
-0.0471     -0.103 *    -0.0753     0.324   0.00588  
(0.053)     (0.060)     (0.053)     (0.227)   (0.054)   
Log Assets  0.0681 ***  0.065 ***  0.0653 ***  0.114 ***  0.0694 *** 
(0.009)     (0.011)     (0.010)     (0.014)   (0.009) 
Cash Percentage  0.591 ***  0.600 ***  0.605 ***  -0.221  0.584 *** 
(0.058)     (0.050)     (0.0518)     (0.201)   (0.0535) 
Leverage  -0.049 ***  -0.072 ***  -0.0640 ***  0.209 **  -0.065 *** 
(0.017)     (0.023)     (0.020)     (0.106)   (0.020) 
Dividends  0.168 0.113  0.112 -0.008  0.164 5 
 
(0.161)     (0.173)     (0.190)     (0.340)   (0.156) 
ROA  -0.186 ***  -0.175 ***  -0.180 ***  0.192 ***  -0.195 *** 
(0.049)     (0.056)     (0.050)     (0.068)   (0.046) 
CAPX  0.573 ***  0.651 ***  0.623 ***  -1.717 ***  0.572 *** 
(0.097)     (0.107)     (0.084)     (0.566)   (0.093) 
Minority 
Interest 
0.282 *** 
(0.049) 
Year Fixed 
Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.104 -0.148  0.464  ***  -1.179  0.120 
(0.122)     (0.181)     (0.168)     (1.344)   (0.206) 
Rho  0.14  **     0.08        0.10  *     0.15  *** 
N 35,886  35,886  35,886  129,667  35,886 
Number of 
Clusters 
(Countries) 
38        38        38       
  
   38    
 
  6 
 
Table V 
The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Diversification: 
Excluding Diversified Firms from the USA 
The table presents the results of both OLS and Heckman self-selection models of excess value where 
firms from the United States are excluded from the sample. In the Heckman model, diversified status is 
modeled as a probit in the first stage, and where the excess value for diversified firms is modeled in the 
second stage. The first stage probit requires a sample of both single-segment and diversified firms, while 
the diversified firms represent the selected group for the second stage analysis. Heckman’s approach 
requires the application of exclusion restrictions to at least one variable – which is included in the first-
stage selection model but that can be excluded from the second-stage regression model for the selected 
firms, since it is uncorrelated with the outcome. To this end, we use an indicator, Minority Interest, for 
whether the firm reports a non-zero amount for the minority interest on its balance sheet. The key 
independent variables in both the OLS and selection models are three institutional variables – capital 
market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market efficiency. Excess Value is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of 
its segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the segment’s sales total with the median market-
to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in the same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the 
logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a country’s capital market efficiency derived from the IMD 
World Competitiveness Yearbook, published annually (rank reversed so that higher values of this 
measure correspond to countries with greater efficiency). Similarly, Labor Market Efficiency, Product 
Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance are logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s 
labor market efficiency, product market efficiency, and overall economic performance, all extracted from 
the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Standard errors are clustered by country and are in 
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   OLS     Heckman Selection Model 
  Excess Value 
Diversified     Excess Value 
   (1st Stage)     (2nd Stage) 
Capital Market Efficiency  -0.111  **    -0.245      -0.142  *** 
  (0.053)    (0.229)     (0.0455)   
Labor  Market  Efficiency  -0.065 **    -0.214 *    -0.086 *** 
  (0.028)     (0.114)     (0.031)   
Product Market Efficiency  -0.146      0.205      -0.118   
  (0.092)     (0.294)     (0.081)   
Economic  Performance  0.001     0.448 ***   0.048  
  (0.050)     (0.168)     (0.048)   
Minority Interest  0.283  *** 
(0.067) 
Controls Yes     Yes     Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.580 **  -2.771 ***  0.190 
(0.260)     (1.023)     (0.249) 
N  19,799 66,078 19,799 
Number of Clusters (Countries)  37 37 
Adjusted R-Sq  0.048 
Rho                    0.211  *** 7 
 
Table VI 
The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Diversification: 
Excluding Diversified Firms from Countries with less than 100 Observations 
The table presents the results of both OLS and Heckman self-selection models of excess value where 
firms from countries with less than 100 observations are excluded from the sample. In the Heckman 
model, diversified status is modeled as a probit in the first stage, and where the excess value for 
diversified firms is modeled in the second stage. The first stage probit requires a sample of both single-
segment and diversified firms, while the diversified firms represent the selected group for the second 
stage analysis. Heckman’s approach requires the application of exclusion restrictions to at least one 
variable – which is included in the first-stage selection model but that can be excluded from the second-
stage regression model for the selected firms, since it is uncorrelated with the outcome. To this end, we 
use an indicator, Minority Interest, for whether the firm reports a non-zero amount for the minority 
interest on its balance sheet. The key independent variables in both the OLS and selection models are 
three institutional variables – capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market 
efficiency. Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to its imputed value. 
A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the 
segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in the 
same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a country’s 
capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, published annually 
(rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater efficiency). 
Similarly,  Labor Market Efficiency,  Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance are 
logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market efficiency, product market efficiency, 
and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
Standard errors are clustered by country and are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * (10% 
level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   OLS     Heckman Selection Model 
  Excess Value 
Diversified     Excess Value 
   (1st Stage)     (2nd Stage) 
Capital Market Efficiency  -0.153  **   -0.369     -0.182  ***
  (0.055)    (0.273)     (0.046) 
Labor Market Efficiency  -0.093  ***   -0.289  **   -0.112  ***
  (0.028)    (0.132)     (0.028) 
Product Market Efficiency  -0.052     0.212     -0.038 
  (0.088)    (0.305)     (0.082) 
Economic Performance  -0.006     0.203     0.007 
  (0.066)    (0.331)     (0.060) 
Minority Interest  0.271  *** 
(0.052) 
Controls Yes     Yes     Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.201  -0.780  0.098 
(0.276)  (1.693)     (0.220) 
N 35,326  126,109  35,326 
Number of Clusters (Countries)  18  18 
Adjusted R-Sq  0.064 
Rho  0.141** 8 
 
Table VII 
The Effect of Institutional Factors on the Value of Diversification: 
Segment Value Imputed using at least Three Single-Segment Comparables 
The table presents the results of both OLS and Heckman self-selection models of excess value, where the 
imputed value of a segment requires only three comparable single-segment firms (rather than five). In the 
Heckman model, diversified status is modeled as a probit in the first stage, and where the excess value 
for diversified firms is modeled in the second stage. The first stage probit requires a sample of both 
single-segment (N = 100733) and diversified firms (N = 42034), while the diversified firms represent the 
selected group for the second stage analysis. Heckman’s approach requires the application of exclusion 
restrictions to at least one variable – which is included in the first-stage selection model but that can be 
excluded from the second-stage regression model for the selected firms, since it is uncorrelated with the 
outcome. To this end, we use an indicator, Minority Interest, for whether the firm reports a non-zero 
amount for the minority interest on its balance sheet. The key independent variables in both the OLS and 
selection models are three institutional variables – capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and 
product market efficiency. Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to 
its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the 
product of the segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least three single-segment 
firms in the same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a 
country’s capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, published 
annually (rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater 
efficiency). Similarly, Labor Market Efficiency, Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance 
are logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market efficiency, product market 
efficiency, and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. Standard errors are clustered by country and are in parentheses. Significance levels are 
denoted by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   OLS     Heckman Selection Model 
  Excess Value 
Diversified     Excess Value 
   (1st Stage)     (2nd Stage) 
Capital  Market  Efficiency  -0.151 ***    -0.342     -0.174 *** 
  (0.052)     (0.227)     (0.047)  
Labor  Market  Efficiency  -0.052 *    -0.260 **    -0.067 ** 
  (0.026)     (0.114)     (0.029)  
Product Market Efficiency  -0.060      0.101      -0.053   
  (0.080)     (0.275)     (0.075)  
Economic  Performance  0.005    0.324  **  0.022   
  (0.045)     (0.163)     (0.045)  
Minority Interest  0.290  *** 
(0.0461) 
Controls  Yes     Yes     Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.057  -1.002  -0.046 
(0.220)     (1.161)     (0.181) 
N 42,034  142,767  42,034 
Number of Clusters (Countries)  40  40 
Adjusted R-Sq  0.056 
Rho                    0.115  *** 9 
 
Table VIII 
The Effect of Changes in Institutional Factors over Time on the Value of Diversification:  
A Within-Country Analysis 
The table presents the results of a within-country analysis of excess values over time. Using multivariate 
OLS regressions with country fixed effects, excess value is modeled as function of three institutional 
variables – capital market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and product market efficiency. Models (1) 
– (3) each include only one of these institutional variables, while all three covariates are included together 
in Model (4). Excess Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value to its imputed 
value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the 
segment’s sales total with the median market-to-sales ratio of at least five single-segment firms in the 
same industry. Capital Market Efficiency is the logarithm of the reversed ordinal ranking of a country’s 
capital market efficiency derived from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, published annually 
(rank reversed so that higher values of this measure correspond to countries with greater efficiency). 
Similarly,  Labor Market Efficiency,  Product Market Efficiency, and Economic Performance are 
logarithms of reversed ordinal rankings of a country’s labor market efficiency, product market efficiency, 
and overall economic performance, all extracted from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
Standard errors are clustered by country and are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * (10% 
level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level). 
 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
   Excess Value     Excess Value     Excess Value     Excess Value 
Capital  market  Efficiency  -0.102 ***                -0.111 ** 
  (0.033)                (0.049)   
Labor  Market  Efficiency       -0.101           -0.098   
       (0.066)           (0.069)   
Product Market Efficiency              -0.004      0.093  * 
            (0.042)     (0.047)   
Economic  Performance  0.050     0.051     0.0201      0.074  * 
  (0.040)     (0.045)     (0.043)      (0.043)   
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.792 ***  -0.819 ***  -1.074  -0.801 *** 
(0.143)     (0.191)     (0.187)      (0.151) 
N 35,886  35,886  35,886  35,886 
Number of Clusters (Countries)  38  38  38  38 
Adjusted R-Sq  0.078        0.078        0.077        0.078    10 
 
  Appendix  
Data Items Used to Construct Institutional Environment Variables 
Data Item  Measure 
Capital Market Efficiency    
Bank Efficiency     
Banking sector assets   Percentage of GDP  
Banking and financial services   Banking and financial services do support business activities efficiently  
Financial institutions' transparency   Financial institutions' transparency is sufficiently implemented  
Finance and banking regulation   Finance and banking regulation is sufficiently effective  
Financial risk factor   The risk factor in the financial system is adequately addressed. 
Stock Market Efficiency     
Stock markets   Stock markets provide adequate financing to companies  
Stock market capitalization   Percentage of GDP  
Value traded on stock markets   US$ per capita  
Listed domestic companies   Number of listed domestic companies  
Shareholders' rights   Shareholders' rights are sufficiently implemented  
Finance Management     
Credit   Credit is easily available for businesses  
Venture capital   Venture capital is easily available for businesses  
Corporate debt   Corporate debt does not restrain the ability of enterprises to compete  
Labor Market Efficiency    
Labor regulations   Labor regulations do not hinder business activities  
Unemployment legislation   Unemployment legislation provides an incentive to look for work  
Immigration laws   Immigration laws do not prevent your company from employing foreign labor  
Redundancy costs   Number of weeks of salary  
Labor market flexibility   Index on rigidity of employment (index 0-100)  
Product Market Efficiency    
Openness     
Tariff barriers   Tariffs on imports: Most favored nation simple average rate  
Customs' authorities   Customs' authorities do facilitate the efficient transit of goods  
Protectionism   Protectionism does not impair the conduct of your business  
Public sector contracts   Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders  
Competition and Regulations     
Government subsidies   To private and public companies as a percentage of GDP  
Subsidies   Subsidies do not distort fair competition and economic development  
State ownership of enterprises   State ownership of enterprises is not a threat to business activities  
Competition legislation   Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition  
Parallel economy   Parallel (black-market) economy does not impair economic development  
Ease of doing business   Ease of doing business is supported by regulations  
Creation of firms   Creation of firms is supported by legislation  
Start-up days   Number of days to start a business  
Start-up procedures   Number of procedures to start a business  
 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Reports 